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Abstract of “Cyclical headwind putting pressure on 
ArcelorMittal’s outlook” 
 
This equity research report provides an analytical and fundamental valuation of the Luxembourg listed 
steelmaker ArcelorMittal. After reviewing the Company’s historical financial and operational 
performance as well as conducting an in-depth industry analysis, we developed a forecast of 
ArcelorMittal’s income statement, balance sheet and cash flow statement to obtain at stock target price 
as of 31.12.2020. The recommendation of this report is to sell the stock of ArcelorMittal due to calculated 
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Increased Chinese steel output meets 
sluggish automotive sector – 
Pressurizing global steel prices 
 
SELL RECOMMENDATION – Top line pressure through 
lower realized steel prices and tenuous demand in core 
markets in the light of ongoing global political turmoil 
 
§ Chinese excess supply – Chinese steel market cuts down its 
efforts to cut excess supply and announced further expansion projects 
in the context of weak domestic demand – Putting deflationary 
pressure on global steel prices (-12.1% until 2022 on Group level) 
§ U.S.-China Trade wars – Section 232 tariffs on Chinese steel 
imports increased domestic capacity – Catalyzing excess supply and 
therefore domestic steel price pressure (-8.8% until 2022 in NAFTA) 
§ Weak automotive sector – Sluggish automotive sector in key 
markets NAFTA and Europe worsens excess supply issue and 
decreases demand for flat products substantially (Steel demand to 
decrease 5.9% on Group level, 15.2% in Europe and 3.0% in NAFTA 
until 2022) 
§ Net Debt target – Announced Net Debt target of $7bn. not 
reached due to sluggish cash generation between 2019-2022; 
Deleveraging up to $8.5bn. achievable through asset sales until 2021. 
MT good on track announcing the divestment of its Global Chartering 
stake to DryLog 
Company description 
ArcelorMittal owns and operates steel manufacturing and mining 
facilities in Europe, Americas, Asia and Africa. The Company 
produces, finished and semi-finished steel products with various 
specifications and holds with 6% market share of the crude steel 
market which makes them the global steel market leader. The 
Luxembourg headquartered Company sells its products through a 
centralized organization to customers in 160 countries and employs 
more than 200,000 employees. 
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(Values in USDm) 2018 2019E 2020F 
Revenues 76,033.0 69,886.1  65,525.1  
EBITDA 10,265.0  5,519.0  5,004.5  
EBIT 6,540.3  2,339.2  2,168.5  
Net Profit 2,828.0  578.3  588.2  
EPS 5.1 0.6 0.6 
DPS 0.2 0.6 0.5 
P/E 3.4x 30.4x 29.9x 
Net Debt/EBITDA 1.2x 1.6x 1.8x 
EV/Sales 0.4x 0.5x 0.5x 
EV/EBITDA 2.9x 5.8x 6.4x 
EV/EBIT 3.9x 13.8x 14.9x 
OR Leverage  40.1% 40.3% 41.1% 
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ArcelorMittal (MT) is a globally leading integrated steel and mining Company and 
resulted from the merger between Mittal Steel Company N.V. and Arcelor in 
2007. The Company operates through the five segments: NAFTA, Europe, Brazil, 
ACIS and Mining. It has steel-producing operations in 19 countries corresponding 
to 48 steel-making facilities. This makes MT the largest steel producer in the 
Americas, Europe and Africa and the fifth largest in the CIS region.1  
Since the merger in 2007, the Mittal family is the largest shareholder, owning 
37.74% of the company’s outstanding shares. The remainder is held by 
Institutions (24.75%) and Public owners (37.46%), while 0.04% correspond to 
Treasury shares.2 
The Company produces a diverse range of finished and semi-finished products, 
specifically flat steel- (e.g. sheets and plates), long steel- (e.g. bars and rods) and 
tubular products for various use-cases. MT owns a diversified range of steel 
production facilities with both, basic oxygen furnaces and electric arc furnaces. In 
the latter, recycled steel scrap can be utilized for the production process while 
basic oxygen furnaces require iron ore and coking coal as main input factors. As 
of 2018, 12.0% of MT’s steel was produced with electric furnaces. Therefore, iron 
ore and coking coal are still the most significant input materials for the Company.  
In that context, MT is considered as integrated steelmaker, meaning that it also 
mines essential input factors for the steelmaking process like iron ore and coal. In 
that regard, 49.0% of the Company’s iron-ore-, and 12.0% of its coal 
requirements are supplied by its own mines. 
MT primarily sells its products in local markets and through its centralized 
marketing organization to a diverse set of end-customers mainly within the 
automotive-, construction-, engineering- and machinery industry. The Company 
additionally owns a downstream distribution business focused on providing value-
added and individualized steel solutions to meet more specific customer 
requirements. 
The strategic focus of the Company lies on the automotive steel business, having 
placed own engineers within the production process of an automotive client, 
supporting the production process of vehicles 5 years before the launch. Looking 
                                                
1 Please note that sources for numbers and percentages are based on MT’s Annual reports and Fact books or the 
Valuation model unless otherwise stated; Please find sources for graphs in the Valuation model.  



































forward, MT recently launched the second generation of iCARe electrical steel 
which plays a substantial role in the production of electronic vehicles.  
NAFTA 
The NAFTA segment corresponds to all the flat-, long- and tubular facilities 
located in North America (Canada, United States and Mexico) and is the second 
largest of the Group contributing to 26.7% to Group Sales and to 24.1% of Group 
EBITDA.3 The majority of produced products (87.0%) are flat, e.g. hot-rolled coil, 
cold-rolled coil or coated steel. These products are predominantly distributed to 
customers within the automotive-, energy- or construction sector. Besides that, 
NAFTA also produces long products like wire rod, rebar, billets but also tubular 
products, together contributing to 13.0% of segment Sales. Note, that the NAFTA 
steel operations are less reliant on iron ore and coking coal as input factors as it 
utilizes a large degree of recycled scrap as input material for steel production.  
Europe 
The Europe segment is the largest one on Group level, corresponding to 53.3% 
of Group Sales and 37.1% of Group EBITDA. Moreover, it is the largest steel 
producer in Europe, covering the whole flat steel product portfolio in all major 
European markets.  
The majority of products (70.0%) are flat (e.g. hot-rolled coil, cold-rolled coil or 
coated steel) primarily distributed to end-customers in the automotive- and 
packaging industry. Europe also produces long products (e.g. wire rod, rebar, 
billets) and tubular products (together 30.0% of segment Sales). Additionally, the 
segment comprises downstream solutions, mainly an in-house trading and 
distribution arm of MT. It further provides value-added steel solutions by offering 
additional steel processing to meet specific customer requirements.  
Brazil 
This segment corresponds to the flat steel operations in Brazil, as well as the 
long and tubular operations in Brazil and adjacent countries including Argentina, 
Costa Rica and Venezuela. The segment contributes to 11.5% of Group Sales 
and 15.0% of Group EBITDA. The product portfolio of the Brazil segment is 
similar to NAFTA and Europe including the full product portfolio within flat-, long- 
and tubular products.  
 
                                                























































The ACIS segment includes production facilities for flat-, long- and tubular 
products located in South Africa and the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
It contributes to 10.5% of Group Sales and 13.7% of Group EBITDA.  
 
Mining 
The Mining segment incorporates all mines owned by MT in the Americas, Asia, 
Europe and Africa. It provides the company with low-cost iron ore and coal 
reserves for its steel operations and hedges MT to a certain point against raw 
material volatility and global supply constraints. Currently MT operates 12 iron 
ore and 2 coal mines worldwide. As of 2018, 49% of its iron ore requirements and 
12% of its coking coal requirements were supplied by own mines. Additionally, a 
certain amount of mineral products is sold to third parties, contributing to 5.5% of 




In distinction to other industries, in which carbon dioxide (CO2) is mainly emitted 
through energy usage, the steel production process itself creates a substantial 
amount of CO2. Therefore, MT places a large focus on the reduction of CO2 
emissions along the steel- and mining production process. In this context, the 
Company focuses on three areas to achieve that transformation. 
Firstly, product innovation. Besides innovative products for the automotive 
industry, MT recently launched its Steligence concept for the use of steel in 
construction, making the construction process more sustainable and improving 
the life-cycle of buildings.  
Secondly, MT wants to improve its contribution to a low-carbon circular economy. 
Therefore, MT announced its goal back in 2007 to reduce CO2 emission by 8% 
until 2020. A crucial part of this strategy is the increased utilization of recycled 
steel scrap in electronic furnaces and to further invest in technologies to 
sustainably decrease the carbon intensity of the steel making process. This 
initiative also includes the recent partnership with LanzaTech, which developed a 
method to convert carbon-containing gas into bioethanol. MT showcases this part 
of their strategy by using a significant degree of recycled materials for building its 
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Thirdly, MT currently develops a credible social and environmental certification 
scheme for both, steel and mining operations in order to provide reassurance to 
end-customers.  
Within our short-term forecast period (2019-2022) we assume that the steel 
industry will suffer from various disruptions, to a significant extent caused by 
socioeconomic and environmental change. Consequently, MT’s Sales are 
expected to decline at a CAGR of 4.4% within that period.4 Beyond that time 
horizon we think the Company will slowly recover from these disruptions at a 
CAGR of 1.1% between 2023-2026 on Group level. In that context, we 
incorporate the efforts and investments the Company makes for sustainable 
development as prerequisite to cope with these disruptions and achieve a 
recovery of 1.1% p.a. Note however, that we do not evaluate these efforts as 
competitive advantage in the short-term as comparable steelmakers are 
engaging in similar investments, as these are necessary to remain successful in 
the market. Put differently, in the absence of these commitments we would not 
assume any recovery on the demand side for MT.  
Improving Organizational Efficiency 
In order to decrease the degree of operational leverage, the Company has 
announced efforts to further improve its organizational structure. In 2018, the 
multi-year acquisition of Vorantim in Brazil was concluded. Consequently, MT 
consolidated its organizational structure for the Brazil operations, resulting in a 
large degree of economies of scales. Moreover, MT announced efforts to create 
a leaner organizational structure in the Europe operations, adjusting for demand 
disruptions in the upcoming years.  
As a result, we let fixed costs on Group level decline with 3.1% p.a. until 2022, 
predominantly stemming from the Europe segment (-5.0% p.a.) and the Brazil 
segment (-6.9% p.a.).5  
Strengthening the Balance Sheet 
Besides past investments in Working Capital and lower M&A spend, the Balance 
sheet focus looking forward lies on deleveraging up to the announced target Net 
Debt level of $7 bn. in 2019.6 However, we do not think that MT will be able to 
meet its target of such a substantial deleveraging for several reasons. First, the 
operating performance declines significantly in the short-term forecast period, as 
Sales are down by 4.4% p.a until 2022 and EBITDA even more so by 11.6% p.a. 
                                                
4 Please note that CAGR within short-term forecast period refers to reported 2018 value as starting point and 2022 as 
ending point. 
5 Percentage decline based on fixed costs synergy estimation by Management. 
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Moreover, the Company has to bear committed Capex in the context of the failed 
Ilva acquisition and several expansion projects in Brazil and Mexico. 
Consequently, we do not think MT’s cash generation will be sufficient to meet its 
declared target.  
The combination of significant disruptions in the upcoming years paired with a 
large committed Capex spend between 2019-2022, leads to our assumptions that 
MT cannot deleverage organically with own cash generation but rather through 
asset sales. Under that assumption, the amount of deleveraging is limited and we 
therefore think the target Net Debt level will be hit in 2021 and will sit at $8.5bn. 
instead of the announced $7bn, corresponding to an industry competitive Net 
Debt to Equity Ratio of 0.47 (Competitors’ mean: 0.5).7  
Further inorganic growth with improved capital allocation 
Looking forward, MT plans to continue its strategy of inorganic growth. However, 
in times of several disruptions in the industry, the Company will be more selective 
in its capital allocation in the upcoming years, primarily investing in high return 
projects.  
Short-term acquisitions therefore target developing markets like Mexico and 
Brazil, as these are not that dependent on the automotive industry as end-
customers but rather generate demand from the construction sector.  
Recent acquisitions include the $1bn. investment in a new hot strip mill in Mexico 
(expected completion in 2020) and $0.3bn. Capex spend for a value-added 
capacity expansion project in Vega do Sul, Brazil.8  
We base our Capex estimation between 2019-2022 on the announced 
investment plan by MT’s management.  
Moreover, we think the focus on developing markets is an appropriate way to 
cope with disruptions in other segments. We therefore think that the NAFTA 
segment will recover in 2022, as soon as the projects in Mexico hit the top line. 
Additionally, Brazil is (together with ACIS) the only segment, in which steel 




                                                
7 We assume $1.2bn. Assets held for Sale are entirely divested in 2021; For forecasting purposed we let Net Debt. 
positions (Excess cash and newly issued Debt) close the Balance sheet beyond 2021, making it vary from $8.5bn. – Not 
that this does not affect our target price. 
8 ArcelorMittal. (2019). 2018 Financial results and Strategic update. 
 
 










The operating performance of the steel industry is generally highly driven by 
economic performance and the associated economic cycles as well as the 
degree of economic development of a country. This stems from the fact that end-
products are predominantly distributed to industries like automotive and 
construction, sectors in which GDP is the main driver of performance. Moreover, 
as both input factors and the end-product are commodities, prices behave in 
commodity super cycles over the long-run.9 
In the short-term however the steel industry is very volatile, which stems from its 
large exposure to general macroeconomic and political conditions. In order to 
capture both, short-term volatilities as well as long-term trends and cycles we 
split the forecast period into a detailed short-term forecast of the years 2019-








Group level summary 
On the demand side, the upcoming years will be characterized by a weak 
automotive industry in the key segments NAFTA and Europe and political 
uncertainties. Until 2022, we expect steel demand to decline by 0.8% p.a in 
NAFTA, resulting from ongoing uncertainties on the outcome of the trade 
conflicts with China. In Europe steel demand will even decrease by 4.0% p.a, as 
the European automotive market is facing more turmoil in regards to the Diesel 
affair in Germany and future environmental regulations.10 The decline in steel 
demand is accompanied by an increase in excess steel supply. China recently 
dissolved its commitment to cut excess supply and announced further capacity 
expansion instead. At the same time expansion projects in the U.S. which 
                                                
9 Medium.com. (2019). Decoding the Commodity Super Cycle. [Online] Available at: 
https://medium.com/technicity/decoding-the-commodity-super-cycle-1e17f34486b9  [Accessed 12 Dec. 2019]. 
10 Exact percentages of demand movements are based on CIQ-Estimates and Broker consensus adjusted by  
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resulted from the introduction of the Section 232 tariff in 2017, will materialize 
and start operations soon. The increasing global excess capacity will put global 
steel prices under pressure, which is catalyzed by declining iron ore prices. As 
we do not see any government commitments to exonerate domestic steel prices, 
we think MT’s average realized steel price on Group level will in total decline by 
12.1% until 2022 with no sustainable recovery in sight.11 In estimating these 
values we employed MT’s realized steel price during the last excess supply crisis 
in 2015 as benchmark for 2022 and adjusted it upwards by c.5% to account for 
increased governmental and regulatory awareness of the issue.12 We let realized 
prices converge to that benchmark accounting for different extents to which MT’s 
segments are affected by excess supply. 
Overall, Group level Sales are expected to decline with a CAGR of -4.4% over 
the short-term forecast period. 
The pressure on the top-line is partly relieved by a decline in total cash costs of 
3.9% annually until 2022. Iron ore prices are bound to reach the peak of the price 
cycle in 2019. Moreover, economies with cheap access to iron ore like China and 
Brazil will inflate supply and even catalyze the decline in global iron ore prices, 
which we assume to go down by 7.2% annually. Lower iron ore prices are 
accompanied by a flexible cost structure on Group level. Within a labor-intensive 
environment, MT has been able to cope with historical shocks in the steel 
industry by laying off temporary workforce. We therefore assume other variable 
costs to decrease by 3.7% annually. Coking coal prices however reach the 
trough of the price cycle in 2019 and experience sustained demand from China 
and India. We therefore expect coking coal prices on Group level to increase by 
3.3% annually. Finally, as already touched upon, MT announced several 
initiatives and projects, aiming to adjust to the sustainably lower steel demand 
predominantly in Europe. Fixed costs on Group level are hence assumed to 
decline by 3.1% annually. MT’s EBITDA margin will go down from 12.3% in 2018 
to 7.9% in 2019. Low iron ore prices, MTs flexible cost structure and 
organizational cost cutting measures however will result in a EBITDA-margin 
expansion up to 9.9% in 2022.  
Long-term forecast 
Based on historical patterns, we assume that steel demand will develop in line 
with regional GDP growth. Our estimates for steel shipments upon 2022 are 
therefore based on a Sales-weighted average GDP growth per respective 
segment. This assumption implicitly states that MT will eventually recover from 
                                                
11 Please find a deep dive into segment specific assumptions under Section “Revenue model”. 












industry specific disruptions occurring between 2019-2022 and will grow in line 
with the economy again. We think this will hold true as MT is investing significant 
amounts in the sustainability of their production process, which will enable them 
to cope with environmental change in the long-term and assume GDP growth 
again. As steel, iron ore and coking coal are commodities, prices follow 
commodity cycles in the long-run, with an average duration of approximately five 
years. We therefore model both realized steel- and mining prices on a 5-year 
rolling average basis. Note however that this approach is only utilized for iron ore 
and coking coal prices realized for Sales purposes in the Mining business. 
Forecasting the effective long-term prices of iron ore and coal MT pays for them 
as input factors in its steel operations is challenging for two reasons. Firstly, MT 
announced several projects aimed at increasing the degree of input factors 
supplied by own mines. This is accompanied by a rising focus on recycled scrap 
as material to cope with environmental standards. Secondly, MT negotiated 
several long-term strategic contracts with its suppliers for which no prices are 
disclosed. Hence, we forecast EBITDA/t beyond 2022 as 9-year rolling average 
of historical values and arrive at iron ore-, coking coal- and other variable costs 
by applying historical splits (e.g. as % of total variable costs). Fixed costs are 
assumed to be constant, as cost cutting projects are expected to be finished 
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Chinese excess supply 
After the positive impact of the resolution of the illegal production capacity affair 
in 2016 and 2017, resulting in less excess steel supply and hence less steel price 
pressure, the Chinese production levels continued to grow at 6.6% in 2018.13 
Moreover, we do not believe that the production levels will slow down in the 
short-term outlook, as the Chinese government recently announced its “Iron ore 
and steel capacity replacement campaign” including the construction of new blast 
furnaces and converters contributing to an increase in capacity of 93 million 
mt/year.14 Furthermore, China officially announced to cut down its effort to reduce 
excess supply by dissolving the Global forum on Steel Excess Supply, an 
initiative launched by the G20 countries to globally reduce steel output.15  
The continuous increase in the Chinese steel production will even worsen the 
issue of excess supply in the short-term outlook. In the light of a slowing 
domestic steel demand, mainly caused by the US-trade conflict and a weak 
automotive industry, it is likely that the Chinese economy will significantly 
increase its steel exports, having a deflationary effect on global steel prices. 
Cheap export prices from China are therefore the main driver of a declining 
average realized steel price of 3.2% p.a. on Group level.  
                                                
13 World Steel Association. (2019). Steel Statistical Yearbook (Concise Version). 
14 Hellenicshippingnews.com. (2019). China to commission 93 million mt/year of new steel capacity in 2020 I Hellenic 
Shipping News Worldwide. [Online] Available at: https://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/china-to-commission-93-million-
mt-year-of-new-steel-capacity-in-2020/ [Accessed 14 Dec. 2019]. 
15 South China Morning Post. (2019). Global steel forum scrapped as China says it had done more than its share. 
[Online] Available at: https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3034753/global-steel-forum-scrapped-china-
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Steel demand - Current steel demand in the U.S. is severely suffering from the 
ongoing ambiguity in the trade conflict with China as well as from the weak 
domestic automotive industry. We do not see either of these conditions to 
improve within the short-term outlook. First, as the U.S. is just entering election 
period, it is not likely that a resolution to the trade conflicts will be developed 
anytime soon. Additionally, the automotive industry will further suffer from 
developments in demographics and climate change, translating in an estimated 
CAGR of -3.0% over 2018-2026.16 We therefore estimate steel demand to 
decline with that rate in 2019. However, we think the announced investments in 
Mexico will yield high returns and start hitting top-line in 2020, fully materializing 
in 2021. We therefore assume demand will only decrease by -1.0% in 2020 and 
2021 and will even recovery slightly with 2.0% in 2022. 
Realized steel price - After President Trump imposed the Section 232 tariffs on 
steel and aluminum, (25% on steel, 10% on aluminum), U.S. steelmakers were 
forced to reinstall some closed production facilities or even invest in new plants. 
The increased crude capacity of these investments will materialize within the 
short-term forecast period. We hence believe that U.S. steel prices will be 
exposed to some serious deflationary pressure in the upcoming years. First, 
these investments will increasingly widen the gap between supply and demand. 









decrease domestic prices even further. Lastly, the historical exchange rate 
development, with the dollar appreciating against other major currencies makes it 
even harder to realize a stable or even growing steel price. We think deflationary 
                                                
16 Wall, M. (2019). Automotive Industry Outlook: Managing Volatility and Leveraging Opportunities in a Dynamic Market 
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export prices and domestic excess supply result in price decreases of 3.0% in 
2019, 6.0% in 2020 and 1.0% in 2021. Steel prices will recover in 2022 by 1.0% 
again, as steel demand is likely to recover and converge to production levels.  
Europe  
Steel demand - The general German economy, a key market for MT, is facing 
severe pressure predominantly from weak export conditions caused by the US-
China trade wars and a declining domestic automotive industry, which is not 
expected to recover in the near-term, especially due to the negative perception of 
Diesel cars but also from the announcement of Germany’s 2030 climate 
package.  
As the Europe segment is even more dependent on the automotive sector as 
NAFTA, we think European steel demand will suffer significantly more in the 
short-term forecast period with growth rates of -7.0% (2019), -5.0% (2020), -3.0% 
(2021) and -1.0% (2022). However, MTs partnerships with relevant OEMs and its 
R&D investments will enable them to accommodate the disruptions in the long-
run, slightly recovering from 2023 onwards.  
Realized steel price – In order to adjust for sustainably lower demand, 
European steel producers cut down their production capacity. As a result, steel 
imports in Europe continued to rise at cheap import prices primarily from the 
Chinese steel market. This imported deflation will put pressure on realized steel 
prices for the European segment. Moreover, further industry consolidation which 
may strengthen the pricing power of European steelmakers cannot be expected 
in the future, especially as the European Commission is likely to abandon the 
potential merger between Thyssenkrupp and Tata steel.17 We therefore expect 
realized steel prices to decline steadily with rates of -4.0% (2019), -3.0% (2020), -
2.0% (2021) and -1.0% in 2022.  
Brazil  
Steel demand - As a result of political tensions (e.g. delayed pension reforms) in 
Brazil and in adjacent countries like Venezuela and Chile, domestic steel demand 
is assumed to suffer accordingly in 2019 decreasing by 4.0%. However, we 
assume that steel demand will recover in the upcoming years. The segment is 
not as dependent on the struggling automotive sector compared to NAFTA and 
Europe, but as developing region rather sources demand from construction 
companies. These characteristics lead us to believe prices will recover with rates 
of 6.0% (2020), 3.0% (2021) and 2.0% (2022).  
                                                
17 Ft.com. (2019). Brussels blocks Thyssenkrupp and Tata Steel merger I Financial times. [Online] Available at: 
https://www.ft.com/content/5f0feae0-8c3f-11e9-a24d-b42f641eca37 its  [Accessed 14 Dec. 2019]. 
 
 








Realized steel price – As the general steel demand of the segment is smaller in 
absolute terms compared to NAFTA and Europe, it is even more exposed to 
weak export conditions caused by the excess supply in China. Additionally, the 
BRL is a comparably weak currency, putting even more pressure on the realized 
price in the segment. We therefore think that the Brazil segment is affected the 
most by global steel price tensions, with prices declining at 9.0% (2019), 7.0% 
(2020), 4.0% (2021) and 3.0% in 2022. 
ACIS  
Steel demand – The steel demand within the ACIS segment will suffer from 
political tensions predominantly in Ukraine in 2019. We therefore expect steel 
demand to decline by 4.0% in 2019. However, we think the administration of 
President Ramaphosa in the key market South Africa and his commitment to 
conduct investments in the energy infrastructure leads us to assume that steel 
demand will recover beyond 2019 with growth rates of 3.0% (2020), 3.0% (2021) 
and 1.0% (2022).18  
Realized steel price – The ACIS segment is generally very dependent on export 
markets. Key countries like Kazakhstan and Ukraine are very dependent on 
Turkey and Middle East as export countries, both of which facing severe 
domestic demand and price pressure. We therefore think that the segment will be 
significantly exposed low global export prices and realized prices will decline by 
8.0% (2019), 6.0% (2020), 3.0% (2021) and 1.0% (2022). 
Cost model 
Variable costs 
Iron ore prices will experience a peak in 2019 and will decline according to the 
commodity super cycle thereafter. Moreover, a substantial amount of iron ore 
demand stems from Europe, in which production capacity will be shut down as a 
result of weaker demand. China, as the largest capacity expanding market 
however enjoys cheap access to iron ore domestically, pushing global iron ore 
prices down. We therefore think iron ore prices will decline gradually from a 
current price of $99.5/t on Group level to an average of $74/t, which lies within 
10.0% of the through of the last price cycle.19 Quite on the opposite, key 
expanding markets like China and India do not have similar sourcing abilities for 
coking coal and will therefore provide sustained demand in the upcoming years. 
                                                
18 Reuters.com. (2019). South Africa’s Ramaphosa gets $13.5bn. of investment pledges at summit. [Online] Available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/safrica-economy/south-africas-ramaphosa-gets-13-5-bln-of-investment-pledges-at-
summit-idUSL8N27M2FN  [Accessed 16 Dec. 2019]. 
19 We took the trough of the last cycle as iron ore price benchmark, adjusted it upwards for current demand and supply 
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As the bottom price of the super cycle will be reached in 2019 at an average of 
$114/t., we let the average price gradually converge to the peak of 2010 of 
$130/t. in 2022. 
Historically MT has adopted a very flexible labor cost structure employing a large 
portion of temporary workers which will be laid off in case of top-line downturns. 
Following this flexibility, we assume other variable costs will deteriorate 
approximately in line with Sales (3.7% p.a.) until 2022.   
Fixed costs 
MTs Management has announced to suspend production in several plants, 
predominantly in Europe in order to adjust for lower steel demand. The most 
recent announced included a temporary production suspension at its Romanian 
steel plant Hunedoara.20 Moreover, synergies of the announced project in Brazil 
will start materializing. Based on Management announcements of synergies and 
fixed costs we assume fixed costs will gradually decline at 3.1% annually, with 
83.9% of cost reductions from the European segment.  
Valuation 
Methodology 
Our target share price (TP) of €15.6 consists to 50% of an intrinsic DCF 
Valuation with an implied share price of €16.7 and to 50% of a relative valuation 
yielding an implied share price of €14.4.21 
Our relative valuation method is consisting on an equal-weighted Sum-of-the-Part 
EV/EBITDA 2020E valuation as well as on ArcelorMittal’s 10-year Forward 
EV/EBITDA multiple of 5.6x. This corresponds to a TSR of 3.9% and results in a 








                                                
20 Romania-insider.com. (2019). ArcelorMittal suspends production at Romanian unit due to high energy prices. [Online] 
Available at: https://www.romania-insider.com/arcelor-temp-suspends-ro-production-dec-2019 [Accessed 16 Dec. 2019]. 
21 Note that MT reports its financials in USD but is listed in EUR – We therefore apply the Exchange rate of 0.90 
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The steel industry is highly cyclical and will be characterized by substantial 
political, socioeconomic and industrial disruptions in the upcoming years. 
Capturing all of these aspects within our DCF assumptions is challenging. We 
therefore employ a hybrid model for deriving our TP in order incorporate the 
market sentiment of such uncertainties within the TP.22 
For the intrinsic valuation, we employed a DCF approach, mainly because MT’s 
management announced its policy of a target capital structure. Although we do 
                                                
22 Please find a detailed elaboration on the relative valuation in the individual part of Tobias Habert (33906). 
ArcelorMittal - Divisional Overview
USDm 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
Sales 79,282.0 63,578.0 56,791.0 68,678.7 76,033.0 69,886.1 65,525.1 63,584.4 63,444.7
NAFTA 21,162.0 17,293.0 15,806.0 17,997.0 20,332.0 19,130.4 17,802.7 17,448.5 17,975.4
Brazil 10,037.0 8,503.0 6,223.0 7,755.0 8,711.0 7,610.3 7,502.3 7,418.2 7,339.7
Europe 39,552.0 31,893.0 29,272.0 36,208.0 40,488.0 36,147.7 33,310.1 31,664.6 31,034.4
ACIS 8,268.0 6,128.0 5,885.0 7,621.0 7,961.0 7,031.2 6,807.6 6,801.4 6,800.8
Mining 4,970.0 3,387.0 3,114.0 4,033.0 4,211.0 4,034.0 3,916.1 3,952.4 3,986.9
Other & elimination (4,707.0) (3,626.0) (3,509.0) (4,935.3) (5,670.0) (4,067.4) (3,813.6) (3,700.7) (3,692.5)
EBITDA 7,245.1 5,227.9 6,254.4 8,408.6 10,265.0 5,519.0 5,004.5 5,273.6 6,264.2
NAFTA 1,215.0 891.0 1,719.5 1,703.4 2,472.0 889.1 681.5 902.0 1,341.0
Brazil 1,845.1 1,227.9 871.0 990.2 1,538.0 848.4 880.2 920.8 1,003.6
Europe 2,304.0 2,393.0 2,502.6 3,559.6 3,809.0 2,191.9 2,233.1 2,318.0 2,873.4
ACIS 620.0 317.0 677.8 1,026.6 1,405.0 822.3 459.7 394.2 269.0
Mining 1,331.0 462.0 762.2 1,407.3 1,278.0 977.0 946.5 929.4 967.6
Other & elimination (70.0) (63.0) (278.6) (278.6) (237.0) (209.7) (196.6) (190.8) (190.3)
EBIT 3,034.1 (4,164.1) 4,159.4 5,435.2 6,540.3 2,339.2 2,168.5 2,378.0 3,313.7
NAFTA 386.0 (705.0) 2,002.1 1,185.4 1,890.0 370.4 152.4 361.8 790.5
Brazil 1,388.1 624.9 613.0 697.1 1,356.0 552.3 578.1 612.3 689.3
Europe 737.0 171.0 1,269.3 2,358.5 1,631.0 604.6 1,021.8 1,081.2 1,613.1
ACIS 95.0 (624.0) 210.5 508.1 1,094.0 513.3 144.5 72.3 (59.0)
Mining 565.0 (3,522.0) 366.4 990.9 860.0 561.7 522.8 496.7 526.8
Other & elimination (137.0) (109.0) (301.9) (304.9) (290.7) (263.0) (251.0) (246.3) (247.0)
Steel Shipments ('000t) 85,125.0 84,586.0 83,934.0 85,241.0 83,854.0 80,222.1 79,112.1 78,502.6 78,930.2
NAFTA 23,074.0 21,306.0 21,281.0 21,834.0 22,047.0 21,385.6 21,171.7 20,960.0 21,379.2
Brazil 10,376.0 11,540.0 10,753.0 10,840.0 11,464.0 11,006.0 11,666.4 12,016.4 12,256.8
Europe 39,639.0 40,676.0 40,247.0 40,941.0 41,020.0 38,148.6 36,241.2 35,153.9 34,802.4
ACIS 12,833.0 12,485.0 13,271.0 13,094.0 11,741.0 11,271.4 11,609.5 11,957.8 12,077.4
Inter-segment elimination (797.0) (1,421.0) (1,618.0) (1,468.0) (2,418.0) (1,589.5) (1,576.7) (1,585.4) (1,585.6)
Mining shipments ('000t)
Iron ore 63,900.0 62,800.0 55,200.0 57,400.0 58,500.0 57,330.0 56,183.4 55,621.6 55,065.4
Coal 7,000.0 6,100.0 6,300.0 6,300.0 5,900.0 6,018.0 6,138.4 6,199.7 6,261.7
Steel prices (USD/t) 873.0 711.6 639.5 758.4 856.5 820.9 778.8 759.6 753.3
NAFTA 917.1 811.6 742.7 824.3 922.2 894.5 840.9 832.5 840.8
Brazil 967.3 736.8 578.7 715.4 759.9 691.5 643.1 617.3 598.8
Europe 997.8 784.1 727.3 884.4 987.0 947.5 919.1 900.7 891.7
ACIS 644.3 490.8 443.4 582.0 678.1 623.8 586.4 568.8 563.1
Mining prices (USD/t) 70.1 49.2 50.6 63.3 65.4 63.7 62.8 63.9 65.0
EBITDA (USD/t) 69.5 56.3 65.4 82.1 107.2 56.6 51.3 55.3 67.1
NAFTA 52.7 41.8 80.8 78.0 112.1 41.6 32.2 43.0 62.7
Brazil 177.8 106.4 81.0 91.3 134.2 77.1 75.4 76.6 81.9
Europe 58.1 58.8 62.2 86.9 92.9 57.5 61.6 65.9 82.6
ACIS 48.3 25.4 51.1 78.4 119.7 73.0 39.6 33.0 22.3













not think that the targeted $7bn. Net Debt will be achieved, we assume that MT 
will operate with a target Net Debt of $8.5bn. which corresponds to a target Net 
Debt to Equity ratio of 0.47 achieved as of 2021, which is more in line with the 
mean of MT’s competitors of 0.5. As this capital structure will be reached in 2021, 
we apply a different WACC in 2020 accounting for the difference in the financial 
profile.  
We performed a sensitivity analysis with respect to the WACC and the 








Based on that, our TP of €15.6 bears a TSR downside of 33.5% not accounting 
for alternative scenarios. Moreover, the market based relative valuation supports 
our sell recommendation as the TP decreases (at our WACC of 10.49%) with the 












                                                
23 Please note that our TP is not sensitive to long-term growth due to a late TV-entrance – Hence it is not accounted for in 
the sensitivity analysis. 
0.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0%
8.1% 18.2 19.5 20.8 22.0 23.3
9.7% 15.9 16.4 16.9 17.4 17.9
10.5% 15.1 15.4 15.6 15.8 16.1
13.3% 13.2 12.8 12.4 12.0 11.6
14.5% 12.7 12.1 11.5 10.9 10.4





ArcelorMittal - Multiple valuation
USDm 2019e 2020e 2021e
EBITDA 5,519.0 5,004.5 5,273.6
Historical EBITDA multiple (median) 5.6x 5.6x 5.6x
Enterprise Value 30,901.9 28,021.0 29,527.7
Total interest bearing debt 12,483.0 12,483.0 12,483.0
Pension obligations 4,844.0 4,844.0 4,844.0
Accrued interest 976.0 976.0 976.0
Non-controlling interest 2,022.0 2,022.0 2,022.0
Equity method investments (4,750.0) (4,750.0) (4,750.0)
Excess cash (3,299.2) (3,299.2) (3,299.2)
Implied Equity Value 18,626.1 15,745.2 17,251.9
NOSH 1,020.0 1,020.0 1,020.0
























Cost of capital 
As MT is exposed to a changing capital structure from 2020 to 2021, we derived 
two different WACCs, one reflecting the financial profile from 2020 and another 
one reflecting a target Net Debt of $8.5bn. until perpetuity. 
In that context, we think MT is exposed to a weighted average cost of capital of 
10.47% in 2020 and 10.49% thereafter.24 
The WACC comprises cost of Equity of 14.1% and after tax cost of Debt of 2.9%. 
The main drivers of the cost of capital are the market risk premium of 7.0%, the 
cash-adjusted levered Equity beta of 1.73 and the target Net Debt level of 
$8.5bn. Based on a sensitivity analysis with respect to the market risk premium 
and the levered beta, we estimate a potential upside to the WACC of 4.0 pp. and 










                                                
24 Please note that the subsequent analysis refers to the 2021-Perpetuity WACC. 
Levered Beta
Non cash-adjusted Cash-adjusted Historical 






























ArcelorMittal - Sum of the Part valuation
USDm EV/EBITDA EBITDA Implied EV
2019e 2020e 2019e 2020e 2019e 2020e
NAFTA 6.7x 7.8x 889.1 681.5 5,919.1 5,336.2
Brazil 7.4x 6.7x 848.4 880.2 6,247.2 5,882.4
Europe 6.6x 5.3x 2,191.9 2,233.1 14,477.5 11,768.6
ACIS 5.0x 5.7x 822.3 459.7 4,109.9 2,625.1
Mining 4.3x 5.0x 977.0 946.5 4,159.5 4,713.7
Other 6.0x 6.1x (209.7) (196.6) (1,253.0) (1,198.1)
Implied SOTP value 5,519.0 5,004.5 33,660.3 29,127.9




Equity method investments (4,750)
Excess cash (3,299.2)
Implied Equity Value 16,852.1
NOSH 1,020.0















Cost of Equity 
In estimating the cost of Equity, we follow industry best practices employing the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).  
We approximate the risk free return by the Yield to Maturity (YTM) of a 10-year 
U.S. Government bond, in order to match the cash flow currency. We did not 
choose to utilize a longer-term bond to ensure the liquidity of the asset. 
We employ two different approaches in estimating MT’s levered beta. First, we 
re-lever the average unlevered beta of MT’s peers with the target D/E ratio of 
0.47. In a second step, we adjust for cash and short-term investments, as this 
position is very large for MT but has a beta of zero and would therefore bias the 
result downwards. We triangulate this approach with the regression of past MT 
returns against S&P 500 returns. Doing so we utilize a time period of 5 years (60 
months) in order to achieve an appropriate noise reduction while maintaining the 
current risk profile of the Company. For the final WACC determination however, 
we use the more forward-looking cash-adjusted beta of 1.73 based on 
competitors, for two main reasons. Firstly, as the analysis is based on 24 
competitors, this method proves to be more robust. Secondly, the regression 
based on past returns is biased by historically high levels of Debt, which MT aims 
to reduce in the forthcoming years. We therefore chose to employ a more 
forward-looking approach, applying a target capital structure to the competitors 












We use three different approaches in determining the market risk premium 
(MRP). The first one is based on historical data and models the MRP as the 






















Monthly return - ArcelorMittal













average monthly excess return of the S&P 500 over the YTM of 1-Month 
Treasury Bills within a time frame of 39 years. As we employ U.S. data in our 
analysis, we adjust our result of 7.8% downwards by 0.8% in order to account for 
the survivorship bias, the phenomenon of the historically above-average 
performance of the U.S. Equity market.25 Due to this adjustment and a large time 
horizon covered, we employ this method for the final WACC derivation.  
We also utilize a more forward looking approach by reverse-engineering the cost 
of Equity required to bring estimated future cash flows for the U.S. Equity market 
to the current level of the S&P 500. The historical dividend yield (1998 – 2019) 
sits at 3.3% while the buyback yield (1998-2019) was 1.9%.26 Hence 5.2% of the 
current S&P 500 value are paid out in cash, which is projected to grow with 5.0% 
over 5 years and then 1.8% perpetually.27 A required rate of return of 8.2% 
(hence MRP of 6.3%) will match these cash flows to the current index value. As 
estimating the MRP is a challenging task we finally triangulate these values with 
industry best practice values between 4.5% and 5.5%.28 
Cost of Debt 
MT issued an USD bond with a face value of $1.25bn. in 2019. We use the 
respective yield to maturity of 3.9% as the cost of Debt, and triangulated this 
value by estimating a default spread of 2.0% based on MT’s interest coverage 
ratio of 2.54x.29 The resulting cost of Debt lie within 0.01 pp. of the initial one. The 
prevailing statutory tax rate in Luxembourg of 26.01% is employed to account for 
tax advantages of Debt.  
Capital structure 
We approximate the current market value of MT’s Equity by the Company’s 
market cap of $18.0bn. as of December 2019.  
The market value of Debt was approximated by the Net Debt estimation 
according to our valuation model of $8.5bn. This contributes to a Net Debt to 
Equity ratio of 0.47, which we assume will prevail until perpetuity as no Equity 
issuances or share buybacks are planned by MT’s management.  
 
                                                
25 Dimson, E., Marsh, P. and Staunton, M. (2006). The Worldwide Equity Premium: A Smaller Puzzle. SSRN Electronic 
Journal. 
26 Yardeni, E., Abbott, J. and Quintana, M. (2019). Corporate Finance Briefing: S&P 500 Buybacks and Dividends- 
Yardeni Research Inc.  
27 Perpetual growth rate modelled as the average projected U.S. GDP growth between 2021 – 2060; 5% growth based on 
Yardeni Research Inc. (Footnote 27).  




Cost of Equity 14.05%
Risk-free Rate 1.92%
Beta 1.73
Market Risk Premium 7.00%
Cost of Debt 2.91%
Cost of Debt (Pre-Tax) 3.93%
Tax Rate 26.01%
Market Cap as % of Total Value 68%















In Q3 2019 MT announced to revise its 2019 Capex spending by $300m. down to 
$3,500m., but no spillover effects into 2020 are expected. This value is still higher 
relative to past years as Capex was being allocated not just to the failed Ilva 
Acquisition but also to significant investments in Mexico ($1bn., commenced 
4Q17, completed 2020) and Brazil (among others). The new hot strip mill (HSM) 
in Mexico will enhance product mix, modernize asset base and aims to take 
share from imports, rather than rely purely on a growing market to absorb 
material. Management therefore projects an IRR larger 15% for the project, 
supporting our hypothesis of a recovering NAFTA segment in 2022. Moreover, 
Management intends to expand Liberia mine from 5 to 15mt. in 2020. The final 
decision has yet to me made, however we evaluate this as an attractive 
investment as it increases the degree of integration and hence further hedges 
MT’s risk exposure to iron ore- and coking coal price volatilities. Hence, we think 
the project will be undertaken, resulting in higher cash needs for Capex at 
$3,600m. in 2020 and 2021. As eventually the discontinuation of the Ilva 
agreement will free up some cash needs (e.g. no lease payment), Capex will be 
declining in 2022 towards $3,300m. Expected spending do also consider smaller 
projects in regards to modernization of asset base as well as growth in scrap 
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Terminal Value (TV) 
We think that MT will enter its steady state in 2041 and computed a Terminal 
Value of $5.5bn. (20.3% of Core EV). We utilized the key value driver formula  
incorporating a long-term growth rate of 2.3%, a RONIC of 10.6% and a WACC 
of 10.5%.  
Terminal value entrance 
We assume that MT will reach its steady state in 2041 as the implied growth rate 
by RONIC and Reinvestment rate sits constant an 2.3% from there on.  
Not only do we assume that the industry and MT itself suffers from significant 
disruptions in demand and realized prices between 2019-2022, but we also 
anticipate that the steel industry will structurally change in the upcoming years 
mainly due to socioeconomic and environmental change. We therefore think a 
rather long detailed forecasting period before entering the steady state makes 
sense in order to cope with these structural changes. 
ROIC & RONIC Development 
We think the return profile of MT will stabilize in 2041 at a RONIC of 10.6% and a 
ROIC of 7.2%. Another reason for the assumed late TV entrance is the 
investment profile of MT. Between the years 2019 and 2024 the return on new 
investments behaves highly volatile. Firstly, the failed Ilva acquisitions for which 
Capex commitments were already made results in a negative RONIC in 2019. 
This also contributes to the fact that the long-term ROIC sits below RONIC. 
Moreover, MT announced to shift its investment focus to high return projects 
following weak demand in Europe, resulting in a RONIC of 52.9% in 2021 and 
even 75.9% in 2022. We think that neither a negative RONIC nor a RONIC 
substantially larger than WACC will sustain in the long-term. This contributes to 
our assumption of a late TV-entrance in 2041, as the investment profile remains 
stable beyond that date.  
Long-term growth 
In estimating the TV, we utilized the growth rate implied by the steady state 
RONIC (10.6%) and Reinvestment rate (22.0%), corresponding to 2.3%. We 
triangulate that value by computing the Sales weighted average GDP CAGR from 
2041-2060 of 1.9%. The implied growth rate based on ROIC corresponds to 
1.6%, however we do not think that this value is representative, as ROIC is 
biased by past negative-return projects.  
In our set-up, the share price is not sensitive to long-term growth for two reasons. 













21% of core EV. Secondly, the three methods for determining long-term growth 
mentioned above yield values within a small range between 1.6% and 2.3%. We 



























Market Cap EV/Sales EV/EBITDA EV/EBIT
CapIQ Estimates as of 10/12/2019 $m 2018 2019 2020E 2018 2019 2020E 2018 2019 2020E
AK Steel 1.050,6 0,5x 0,6x 0,6x 5,2x 7,8x 9,2x 8,7x 13,9x 16,6x
Nucor 17.510,7 0,8x 0,9x 1,0x 5,0x 6,1x 8,2x 6,2x 7,8x 11,8x
Steel Dynamics 7.555,9 0,7x 0,9x 0,9x 4,3x 6,7x 7,4x 5,1x 8,9x 10,2x
US Steel 2.346,5 0,3x 0,4x 0,4x 2,6x 6,1x 6,6x 4,0x 28,2x 33,6x
Average NAFTA 7.115,9 0,6x 0,7x 0,7x 4,3x 6,7x 7,8x 6,0x 14,7x 18,1x
Salzgitter 1.143,5 0,1x 0,2x 0,2x 1,5x 4,0x 3,0x 2,8x 14,5x 7,9x
SSAB 3.373,1 0,6x 0,6x 0,6x 5,2x 6,1x 6,1x 9,5x 14,2x 12,6x
Thyssenkrupp 7.909,2 0,3x 0,3x 0,3x 6,0x 9,6x 5,1x 14,4x N/M 12,4x
Voestalpine 4.907,7 0,6x 0,7x 0,7x 5,0x 6,8x 6,8x 10,2x 17,8x 19,4x
Average Europe 4.333,4 0,4x 0,4x 0,4x 4,4x 6,6x 5,3x 9,2x 15,5x 13,1x
CSN 4.386,7 2,0x 1,8x 1,9x 8,4x 6,2x 6,6x 10,9x 8,2x 8,7x
Gerdau 6.669,3 0,9x 1,0x 0,9x 6,4x 7,0x 6,3x 8,8x 11,1x 9,5x
Usiminas 2.710,8 1,3x 1,2x 1,1x 6,2x 8,9x 7,2x 8,9x 18,4x 12,7x
Average Brazil 4.588,9 1,4x 1,3x 1,3x 7,0x 7,4x 6,7x 9,5x 12,5x 10,3x
Magnitogorsk 6.888,8 0,8x 0,9x 1,0x 2,8x 3,6x 3,8x 3,7x 5,0x 5,4x
Nippon Steel 14.791,6 0,7x 0,7x 0,7x 5,8x 6,2x 8,6x 12,6x 17,0x 44,0x
Novolipetsk 12.525,8 1,1x 1,4x 1,4x 4,0x 5,5x 5,7x 4,8x 7,0x 7,3x
Posco 15.684,4 0,5x 0,5x 0,5x 3,6x 4,2x 4,2x 5,6x 7,5x 7,5x
Severstal 11.275,4 1,5x 1,5x 1,6x 4,0x 4,5x 4,9x 4,6x 5,3x 6,0x
Tata Steel 6.491,6 0,9x 1,0x 1,0x 4,7x 6,0x 7,1x 6,2x 8,9x 11,8x
Average ACIS 11.276,3 0,9x 1,0x 1,0x 4,2x 5,0x 5,7x 6,3x 8,5x 13,7x
Exxaro 2.292,7 1,5x 1,4x 1,1x 3,5x 6,5x 4,8x 4,1x 11,2x 6,8x
New Hope 1.144,9 1,8x 1,5x 1,9x 4,2x 3,8x 5,5x 5,3x 5,0x 7,8x
Whitehaven Coal 1.784,8 1,3x 1,2x 1,6x 2,0x 2,0x 6,0x 3,7x 3,7x 10,1x
Average Coal 1.740,8 1,5x 1,4x 1,5x 3,2x 4,1x 5,4x 4,4x 6,6x 8,3x
Cliffs 2.298,4 1,5x 2,0x 2,0x 4,6x 7,4x 8,7x 5,2x 9,0x 10,7x
Ferrexpo 1.110,7 1,1x 0,9x 1,1x 2,9x 2,2x 3,7x 3,3x 2,6x 4,6x
Fortescue 21.552,3 3,4x 2,4x 2,0x 7,6x 4,0x 3,3x 12,8x 5,0x 4,1x
Kumba 8.991,7 2,9x 1,9x 2,1x 6,5x 3,4x 4,2x 8,2x 3,8x 4,9x
Average Iron 8.488,3 2,2x 1,8x 1,8x 5,4x 4,3x 5,0x 7,4x 5,1x 6,1x
Weighted Multiple 0,7x 0,7x 0,7x 4,7x 6,1x 5,9x 7,5x 11,3x 11,5x










































Forecasted Balance sheet 2014A 2015A 2016A 2017A 2018A 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
Operating cash 1,585.6 1,271.6 1,135.8 1,373.6 1,520.7 1,397.7 1,310.5 1,271.7 1,268.9
Trade accounts receivable and other 3,696.0 2,679.0 2,974.0 3,863.0 4,432.0 3,573.4 3,409.6 3,434.5 3,447.8
Inventories 17,304.0 13,424.0 14,734.0 17,986.0 20,744.0 17,397.5 16,733.9 16,930.9 16,528.7
Prepaid expenses 272.0 203.0 184.5 160.5 208.0 208.9 190.1 180.7 175.2
Property, plant and equipment and biological assets 46,593.0 35,780.0 34,831.0 36,971.0 35,638.0 36,358.2 37,122.3 37,826.8 38,176.3
Goodwill and intangible assets 8,104.0 5,592.0 5,651.0 5,737.0 5,728.0 5,728.0 5,728.0 5,728.0 5,728.0
Other short-term tax related receivables, net 450.0 273.0 213.0 326.0 502.0 350.4 319.9 317.9 333.0
Other long-term tax related receivables, net 290.0 206.0 387.0 385.0 512.0 364.1 361.8 380.1 368.6
Investments in Joint Ventures 1,809.0 1,443.0 1,507.0 1,249.0 1,011.0 1,011.0 1,011.0 1,011.0 1,011.0
TOTAL OPERATING ASSETS 80,103.6 60,871.6 61,617.3 68,051.1 70,295.7 66,389.3 66,187.0 67,081.5 67,037.5
Trade accounts payable and other 11,450.0 10,416.0 11,633.0 13,428.0 13,981.0 12,679.5 12,390.5 12,450.3 11,970.7
Operating Provisions 1,853.0 1,741.0 1,534.0 1,694.0 2,165.0 1,829.7 1,715.5 1,664.7 1,661.1
Accrued payroll and employee related expenses 1,869.0 1,568.0 1,560.0 1,787.0 1,613.0 1,740.6 1,651.1 1,626.5 1,554.6
Unearned revenue and accrued payables 59.0 56.0 39.0 69.0 58.0 57.0 54.4 52.1 53.7
TOTAL OPERATING LIABILITIES 15,231.0 13,781.0 14,766.0 16,978.0 17,817.0 16,306.8 15,811.6 15,793.7 15,240.1
Core Invested Capital 64,872.6 47,090.6 46,851.3 51,073.1 52,478.7 50,082.5 50,375.4 51,287.7 51,797.4
Restricted cash 123.0 100.0 114.0 212.0 182.0 148.3 146.6 150.7 154.9
Non-Operating Receivables 726.0 369.0 676.5 935.5 2,401.0 2,401.0 2,401.0 2,401.0 2,401.0
Derivative Financial Instruments, net 62.0 85.0 206.0 757.0 1,036.0 1,036.0 1,036.0 1,036.0 1,036.0
Assets held for sale, net 257.0 42.0 164.0 129.0 1,290.0 1,290.0 1,290.0 0.0 0.0
Equity Method Investments 5,226.0 4,160.0 3,716.0 5,306.0 4,750.0 4,750.0 4,750.0 4,750.0 4,750.0
Deferred Tax Assets, net 4,958.0 4,129.0 3,308.0 4,371.0 5,913.0 5,913.0 5,913.0 5,913.0 5,913.0
Other Non-Operating Assets 1,363.0 818.0 488.0 457.0 567.0 567.0 567.0 567.0 567.0
TOTAL NON-OPERATING ASSETS 12,715.0 9,703.0 8,672.5 12,167.5 16,139.0 16,105.3 16,103.6 14,817.7 14,821.9
Non-operating Payables 915.0 852.0 833.0 943.0 1,332.0 1,332.0 1,332.0 1,332.0 1,332.0
Deferred employee benefit, funded 3,689.0 3,034.0 2,394.0 2,218.0 2,138.0 2,766.1 2,503.4 2,347.5 2,210.8
Provisions for Litigation 758.0 463.0 413.0 328.0 369.0 471.7 405.4 379.4 362.0
Other Non-Operating Liabilities 2,212.0 611.0 566.0 963.0 3,019.0 3,019.0 3,019.0 3,019.0 3,019.0
TOTAL NON-OPERATING LIABILITIES 7,574.0 4,960.0 4,206.0 4,452.0 6,858.0 7,588.8 7,259.8 7,077.9 6,923.9
Non-core Invested Capital 5,141.0 4,743.0 4,466.5 7,715.5 9,281.0 8,516.5 8,843.8 7,739.7 7,898.0
Debt and Debt equivalents
Short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt 2,522.0 2,308.0 1,885.0 2,785.0 3,167.0 3,167.0 3,167.0 1,877.0 1,877.0
Accrued interest and other payables 979.0 1,026.0 781.0 794.0 976.0 976.0 976.0 976.0 976.0
Long-term debt, net of current portion 17,275.0 17,478.0 11,789.0 10,143.0 9,316.0 9,316.0 9,316.0 9,316.0 9,316.0
Unfunded portion of pension plan benefits 1,603.0 1,383.0 1,324.0 1,483.0 1,335.0 1,335.0 1,335.0 1,335.0 1,335.0
Unfunded portion of other post employment benefits 4,782.0 4,799.0 4,579.0 3,929.0 3,509.0 3,509.0 3,509.0 3,509.0 3,509.0
Non-controlling interests 3,074.0 2,298.0 2,190.0 2,066.0 2,022.0 2,022.0 2,022.0 2,022.0 2,022.0
DEBT AND DEBT EQUIVALENTS (excl. Excess cash and newly issued Debt) 30,235.0 29,292.0 22,548.0 21,200.0 20,325.0 20,325.0 20,325.0 19,035.0 19,035.0
Excess Cash (2,307.4) (2,730.4) (1,365.2) (1,200.4) (651.3) (3,811.9) (3,299.2) (2,729.9) (2,407.4)
Newly issued Debt 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOTAL DEBT AND DEBT EQUIVALENTS 27,927.6 26,561.6 21,182.8 19,999.6 19,673.7 16,513.1 17,025.81 16,305.1 16,627.6
Equity and Equity equivalents
Common shares 10,011.0 10,011.0 401.0 401.0 364.0 364.0 364.0 364.0 364.0
Treasury shares (399.0) (377.0) (371.0) (362.0) (569.0) (569.0) (569.0) (569.0) (569.0)
Additional paid-in capital 20,258.0 20,294.0 34,826.0 34,848.0 34,894.0 34,894.0 34,894.0 34,894.0 34,894.0
Retained earnings 22,182.0 13,902.0 16,049.0 20,635.0 25,611.0 25,611.0 25,718.4 26,247.4 26,592.8
Mandatory convertible notes 1,838.0 1,800.0 - - - - - - -
Reserves (11,804.0) (20,358.0) (20,770.0) (16,733.0) (18,214.0) (18,214.0) (18,214.0) (18,214.0) (18,214.0)


































Working capital forecast 2014A 2015A 2016A 2017A 2018A 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
a) Operating Working Capital schedule
Operating Cash 1,585.6 1,271.6 1,135.8 1,373.6 1,520.7 1,397.7 1,310.5 1,271.7 1,268.9
Trade accounts receivable and other 3,696.0 2,679.0 2,974.0 3,863.0 4,432.0 3,573.4 3,409.6 3,434.5 3,447.8
Inventories 17,304.0 13,424.0 14,734.0 17,986.0 20,744.0 17,397.5 16,733.9 16,930.9 16,528.7
Prepaid expenses 272.0 203.0 184.5 160.5 208.0 208.9 190.1 180.7 175.2
Other short-term tax related receivables, net 450.0 273.0 213.0 326.0 502.0 350.4 319.9 317.9 333.0
Trade accounts payable and other 11,450.0 10,416.0 11,633.0 13,428.0 13,981.0 12,679.5 12,390.5 12,450.3 11,970.7
Operating Provisions 1,853.0 1,741.0 1,534.0 1,694.0 2,165.0 1,829.7 1,715.5 1,664.7 1,661.1
Accrued payroll and employee related expenses 1,869.0 1,568.0 1,560.0 1,787.0 1,613.0 1,740.6 1,651.1 1,626.5 1,554.6
Unearned revenue and accrued payables 59.0 56.0 39.0 69.0 58.0 57.0 54.4 52.1 53.7
Total operating working capital 8,076.6 4,069.6 4,475.3 6,731.1 9,589.7 6,621.2 6,152.4 6,341.9 6,513.5
Changes in operating working capital - (4,007.1) 405.8 2,255.8 2,858.6 (2,968.5) (468.8) 189.6 171.6
Cash flow map 2014A 2015A 2016A 2017A 2018A 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
NOPLAT (6,044.8) 2,800.2 4,890.9 6,482.8 1,730.8 1,604.5 1,759.5 2,451.8
Depreciation and Amortization (3,192.0) (2,721.0) (2,768.0) (2,799.0) (2,779.8) (2,835.9) (2,895.5) (2,950.5)
Gross cash flow (2,852.8) 5,521.2 7,658.9 9,281.8 4,510.6 4,440.4 4,655.0 5,402.3
- % change, YoY - -293.5% 38.7% 21.2% -51.4% -1.6% 4.8% 16.1%
Changes in operating working capital 4,007.1 (405.8) (2,255.8) (2,858.6) 2,968.5 468.8 (189.6) (171.6)
Net Capex 7,621.0 (1,772.0) (4,908.0) (1,466.0) (3,500.0)    (3,600.0)    (3,600.0)    (3,300.0)    
Change in other long-term assets 84.0 (181.0) 2.0 (127.0) 147.9 2.4 (18.3) 11.5
Change of Investments in Joint Ventures 366.0 (64.0) 258.0 238.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investments in Goodwill and intangible assets 2,512.0 (59.0) (86.0) 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investing cash flow 14,590.1 (2,481.8) (6,989.8) (4,204.6) (383.6) (3,128.8) (3,807.9) (3,460.1)
Operating FCF 11,737.3 3,039.4 669.2 5,077.2 4,126.9 1,311.6 847.2 1,942.2
- % change, YoY - -74.1% -78.0% 658.7% -18.7% -68.2% -35.4% 129.3%
Non-operating result (9,239.3) 296.0 4,414.5 (1,092.6) 159.7 242.8 376.2 299.7
Changes in non-operating invested capital 398.0 276.5 (3,249.0) (1,565.5) 764.5 (327.2) 1,104.0 (158.3)
Non-operating FCF (8,841.3) 572.5 1,165.5 (2,658.1) 924.2 (84.4) 1,480.2 141.4
- % change, YoY - -106.5% 103.6% -328.1% -134.8% -109.1% -1852.8% -90.4%
Financial result (2,022.9) (1,521.2) (647.4) (1,635.2) (1,312.2) (1,259.1) (1,115.5) (1,089.6)
Changes in Debt and Debt equivalents (1,366.1) (5,378.7) (1,183.2) (325.9) (3,160.6) 512.7 (720.7) 322.5
Changes in Equity and Equity equivalents (16,814.0) 4,863.0 8,654.0 3,297.0 0.0 107.4 529.0 345.5
Total comprehensive income (17,307.0) 1,575.0 8,658.0 3,755.0 578.3 588.2 1,020.2 1,662.0
Financing cash flow (2,896.0) (3,612.0) (1,834.7) (2,419.1) (5,051.1) (1,227.2) (2,327.4) (2,083.6)
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Forecasted Income Statement 2014A 2015A 2016A 2017A 2018A 2019E 2020E 2021E 2022E
Sales 79.282,0 63.578,0 56.791,0 68.679,0 76.033,0 69.886,1 65.525,1 63.584,4 63.444,7
Cost of sales (69.349,0) (62.004,0) (47.707,0) (58.108,0) (64.226,0) (61.808,3) (58.130,9) (56.036,7) (54.949,5)
Gross Margin 9.933,0 1.574,0 9.084,0 10.571,0 11.807,0 8.077,9 7.394,2 7.547,7 8.495,1
Selling, general and administrative expenses (2.960,0) (2.543,0) (2.202,0) (2.369,0) (2.469,0) (2.558,9) (2.389,7) (2.274,1) (2.230,9)
EBITDA 6.973,0 (969,0) 6.882,0 8.202,0 9.338,0 5.519,0 5.004,5 5.273,6 6.264,2
Depreciation and Amortization (3.939,0) (3.192,0) (2.721,0) (2.768,0) (2.799,0) (2.779,8) (2.835,9) (2.895,5) (2.950,5)
Exceptional items (243,0) (6.180,0) 627,0 (206,0) (927,0) (400,0) 0,0 0,0 0,0
EBIT 2.791,0 (10.341,0) 4.788,0 5.228,0 5.612,0 2.339,2 2.168,5 2.378,0 3.313,7
Taxes (1.492,5) (1.883,8) (1.360,8) (543,1) (56,2) (608,4) (564,0) (618,5) (861,9)
NOPLAT 1.298,5 (12.224,8) 3.427,2 4.684,9 5.555,8 1.730,8 1.604,5 1.759,5 2.451,8
Non-core result before taxes (172,0) (502,0) 615,0 448,0 652,0 215,8 328,1 508,4 405,1
Non-core taxes 50,3 146,7 (160,0) (116,5) (169,6) (56,1) (85,3) (132,2) (105,4)
Other comprehensive income (5.687,0) (8.884,0) (159,0) 4.083,0 (1.575,0) 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Non-core result (5.808,7) (9.239,3) 296,0 4.414,5 (1.092,6) 159,7 242,8 376,2 299,7
Financing costs - net (3.382,0) (2.858,0) (2.056,0) (875,0) (2.210,0) (1.773,5) (1.701,7) (1.507,6) (1.472,6)
Tax shield 988,2 835,1 534,8 227,6 574,8 461,3 442,6 392,1 383,0
Financial result (2.393,8) (2.022,9) (1.521,2) (647,4) (1.635,2) (1.312,2) (1.259,1) (1.115,5) (1.089,6)
Total comprehensive income (6.904,0) (23.487,0) 2.202,0 8.452,0 2.828,0 578,3 588,2 1.020,2 1.662,0
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This report is focusing on MT’s comparable companies and their selection, which have been used to 
build up a target price estimate via a hybrid comparable valuation technique. Besides that, another section 
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Comparable companies 
Given MT’s cyclical business, our target price is 50:50 based on our DCF and 12-month forward 
EV/EBITDA multiple valuation. Further, to capture MT’s multinational operations, as well as the USP 
of being an integrated steel producer, we included an equal-weighted sum-of-the-parts valuation (25%) 
in our target price estimation. The other part of our multiple valuation (25%) reflects MT’s long-term 
EV/EBITDA forward median multiple of 5.6x. With a focus on MT’s divisional structure, we defined 
the company’s peer group by looking on several measures, which are described below.  
 
Identifying a comparable universe of competitors 
To account for MT’s global footprint, we divided our peer group into regions and added the mining 
business. To narrow down the wide competition within the steel industry, we had a strong focus on the 
financial profile (especially on operating metrics as well as debt capacity), product mix, business model 
and strategy, life cycle stage as well as the size of the companies. Evaluating the relevant steel and 
mining players lead to different margin profiles within their respective region and business. While the 
average 2020 EBITDA-margin in ACIS is at 20.8%, sluggish European players do only post a 6.5% 
EBITDA-margin. This gap is showing structural cost differences within the global steel industry and 
MT’s constant margin pressure. European steelmakers are facing some challenges, high costs and an on-
going weak automotive industry are pressurizing growth, resulting in weaker margins. Thyssenkrupp is 
currently about to sell its elevator business, in order to get some financial headroom to restructure their 
tarnished steel business.1 
Noteworthy is also the strong growth of the plain Coal and Iron ore players compared to the steel 
producers. Strong growth comes inter alia from the Brazilian dam failure, good weather conditions and 

























Source: Valuation model, CapitalIQ 
 
Selection of an appropriate multiple for the target price calculation 
First, we looked at the most common multiples like EV/Sales, EV/EBITDA, EV/EBIT as well as P/E, 
but ended up with the EBITDA multiple for several reasons. EBITDA is a well-known proxy for 
operating cash flow and reflects the price to cash flow relation adequately. Given comparable 
competitors within different regions and hence changing depreciation policies, a D&A unaffected 
multiple is most appropriate. The EV/EBITDA multiple is mostly affected by a firm’s level of capital 
intensity and therefore, all things being equal, higher capital intensity lowers the respective multiple. 
Breaking down the capital intensity of the industry within our benchmark analysis, showed that this was 
in-line with MT’s capital spendings. Besides the arguments for using the EBITDA multiple as part of 
our target price recommendation, we also considered the drawbacks of cash flow proximity, capex, and 
dependency of positive figures. In the interest of clean multiple valuation, we used forward looking 
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AK Steel 9.0% 5.5% (0.7%) 2.1% 9.0% 83.0% 380.0% (26.7%) 210.5%
Nucor 14.0% 10.9% (0.5%) (7.8%) (6.0%) 29.1% 130.0% 6.7% 14.4%
Steel Dynamics 13.5% 10.6% (2.1%) (20.0%) (24.6%) 38.3% 170.0% (7.1%) 17.2%
US Steel 6.3% 2.3% 1.4% (35.7%) (62.5%) 40.1% 320.0% 6.5% 99.6%
Average NAFTA 10.7% 7.3% (0.5%) (15.3%) (21.0%) 47.6% 250.0% (5.2%) 29.4%
Salzgitter 3.6% 0.6% (1.4%) (55.7%) (86.1%) 27.3% 350.0% (36.2%) 59.7%
SSAB 9.8% 4.5% 8.3% (5.6%) (18.9%) 19.7% 210.0% (6.9%) 36.3%
Thyssenkrupp 2.6% 0.0% 1.1% (37.6%) (99.9%) 77.0% 670.0% 87.4% 44.2%
Voestalpine 9.9% 3.7% 1.2% (28.0%) (54.8%) 46.8% 400.0% 22.5% 102.1%
Average Europe 6.5% 2.2% 2.3% (31.7%) (64.9%) 42.7% 407.5% 16.7% 60.1%
CSN 21.7% 16.4% 13.9% 17.1% 22.9% 74.8% 550.0% (25.3%) 156.0%
Gerdau 13.0% 8.5% (9.0%) (10.4%) (17.3%) 36.9% 300.0% 3.4% 46.8%
Usiminas 16.0% 10.3% 8.3% 4.4% 13.0% 30.0% 290.0% 12.9% 44.9%
Average Brazil 16.9% 11.7% 4.4% 3.7% 6.2% 47.3% 380.0% (3.0%) 81.2%
Magnitogorsk 25.3% 18.7% (4.8%) (19.9%) (23.4%) 13.6% 40.0% (7.8%) (1.1%)
Nippon Steel 10.0% 3.2% 8.5% 21.0% 19.6% 41.9% 410.0% 9.8% 136.9%
Novolipetsk 26.0% 21.1% (5.0%) (17.2%) (18.8%) 31.5% 90.0% (7.2%) 13.8%
Posco 12.2% 7.0% 1.6% (8.3%) (15.4%) 29.9% 260.0% - 54.8%
Severstal 35.1% 30.1% (3.1%) (3.5%) (5.7%) 44.1% 90.0% (8.4%) 11.5%
Tata Steel 16.0% 10.7% (0.3%) (14.5%) (26.9%) 57.7% 420.0% 11.5% 211.2%
Average ACIS 20.8% 15.1% (0.5%) (7.1%) (11.8%) 36.4% 218.3% (0.4%) 67.3%
Exxaro 25.2% 18.2% 3.5% 137.1% 278.7% 10.0% 80.0% 6.1% 2.3%
New Hope 39.6% 30.4% 21.1% 10.4% 5.4% 15.5% 70.0% (8.6%) 18.2%
Whitehaven Coal 58.1% 31.7% 10.1% 0.7% (0.5%) 10.6% 30.0% (12.4%) 11.5%
Average Coal 41.0% 26.8% 11.6% 49.4% 94.5% 12.0% 60.0% (5.0%) 10.7%
Cliffs 27.8% 24.0% 0.2% (19.9%) (21.7%) 85.4% 350.0% 4.0% 74.4%
Ferrexpo 43.7% 38.8% 18.1% 30.4% 29.4% 25.5% 60.0% - 25.4%
Fortescue 59.3% 47.3% 44.7% 89.4% 155.7% 27.2% 70.0% (19.3%) 9.6%
Kumba 55.4% 48.0% 37.0% 92.8% 95.4% 0.8% 0.0% (12.1%) (14.4%)
Average Iron 46.6% 39.5% 25.0% 48.2% 64.7% 34.7% 120.0% (9.1%) 8.2%
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High 59.3% 48.0% 44.7% 137.1% 278.7% 85.4% 670.0% 87.4% 211.2%
Low 2.6% 0.0% (9.0%) (37.6%) (99.9%) 0.8% 0.0% (19.3%) (14.4%)
Mean 24.2% 17.5% 6.5% 5.6% 8.4% 37.6% 244.2% 0.4% 50.2%
Median 16.9% 11.7% 1.6% (7.1%) (15.4%) 36.4% 250.0% (5.0%) 50.8%
In general, four different pricing base multiples can be used: (1) historical, (2) current, (3) forward 
and (4) partial-forward.2 In our valuation we considered, as mentioned earlier, the historical median 
EV/EBITDA multiple as well as the forward-looking EV/EBITDA multiple. The historical-priced 
multiples are, as the name already states, a historical range of enterprise values and historical earnings. 
Mostly, those kinds of multiples are used to establish a profound trading range, as we used in our report. 
Forward-looking multiples are a comparison of forward enterprise value with forecasted earnings and 
are taken to investigate and analyze the current value of a company. A forward-looking multiple can be 
also sometimes seen as a partial multiple-expressed DCF valuation. By having in mind, that the entire 
steel industry is heavily dependent on global economic development, it is a decent way to value the 
industry with such multiples. Technically, a forward price is the required price an investor needs to earn 
in order to make return over the cost of capital, which can be expressed as the following: 
Forward price t1 = Price t0 * (1+ Cost of Capital) – Investor Cash Flow t12 
One of the major concepts behind the usage of forward-looking multiples to value companies, is the 
assumption of a certain degree of maturity and differences in value are true differences rather than the 
stage of the lifecycle. All our selected peers are long-active players within the steel industry, hence 
reflecting all the same lifecycle stages. 
By looking at the different EV/EBITDA multiples of our comparable companies, different levels of size 
can be observed. While the European comps do trade on average at 5.3x 2020E EBITDA, NAFTA 
players show on average 7.8x of their 2020E EBITDA.  
 
Explanation of different multiples: 
For a better understanding of different multiples, they need an analytical framework in the form of a 
function of (1) cash generation, (2) risk and (3) growth.3 As a way of conceptualizing the relationship 








EV: Enterprise Value 
FCFFn: Free Cash Flow to Frim 
g: Growth 
WACC: Weighted average cost of capital 
Dividing both sides of the equation by EBITDA, we can express the multiple as the following:3  
 
Cash generation 
Ability to translate EBITDA into Cash Flow. Higher cash generation will increase numerator and leading 
to a larger multiple – in line with the concept of the peer comparison as stronger cash generation implies 
a higher multiple. 
Risk  
Risk and return are correlated, and should, therefore, be managed concerning the generation of return. 
More risk, expressed by a higher WACC, will lower the size of the respective multiple. 
Growth 
Growth, that generates a return above the WACC, is driving a higher valuation and therefore resulting 
in a higher multiple. Of course, this is a function of reinvestment in relation to the cost of financing of 
the respective project.  
 
A more detailed view on one of the most important competitor: Nippon Steel 
ArcelorMittal is the leading player in the global steel market, generating approx. 6% of the global crude 
steel market value.4 One of MT’s major competitors is, based on MarketLine4 and our market 
understanding, Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal Corp. Nippon is listed and headquartered in Tokyo, 
Japan and is active in various businesses such as steelmaking, engineering, chemicals, new materials, 
and system solutions. The company serves, like ArcelorMittal, customers within the automotive, 
																																								 																				
3 Robinson, G. and Weyns, G. (2017). Fundamental Equity Analytics - How to...analyse and talk the language of multiples. Global Research UBS 
Limited 
4 MarketLine Industry Profile Global Steel September 2018. (2018). MarketLine. 
	
construction, civil engineering, railway sector. Moreover, the Asian player has manufacturing sites 
across Japan, Middle East, APAC, Europe as well as America, producing 46.8m tons of crude steel in 
FY18.4 As steel demand is diminishing, producers are forced to pool resources to sustain pressure from 











The MSCI Metals and Mining index gained around 13% during 2019, Nippon and ArcelorMittal lost 
both around 12% (Beta of Nippon’s: 1.32, MT 1.7). This proofs MT’s and Nippon’s highly cyclical 
business exposure in a global context. Having a look at the trading stats of the two steelmakers, MT’s 
10Y EV/EBITDA forward multiple is at 5.6x, at the same time Nippon is trading over the same period 
at 7.5x. For 2020, the market sentiment is expecting Nippon to reach an EV/EBITDA trading level of 
8.6x and therefore significantly higher than MT’s expected 4.9x. Following Morningstar, Nippon has 
Cost of Equity of 11.5% and Pre-Tax Cost of Debt of 4.5%, resulting in a Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital of 6.7%6. Besides that, Nippon is expected to grow at 3.0% in perpetuity. Comparing MT’s 
opportunity cost of approx. 10.5% and a growth rate of c.2.3%, Nippon’s higher EV/EBITDA multiple 






5 Corporate.arcelormittal.com. (2020). ArcelorMittal and Nippon Steel complete acquisition of Essar Steel. [online] Available at: 
https://corporate.arcelormittal.com/news-and-media/press-releases/2019/dec/16-12-2019 [Accessed 2 Jan. 2020]. 
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